The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation by Alan J. Auerbach & Alan J. Auerbach
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
THE THEORY OF EXCESS BURDEN
AND OPTIMAL TAXATION
Alan J. Auerbach
Working Paper No. 1025
NATIONALBUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge MA 02138
November 1982
The research reported here is part of the NBER's researchprogram
in Taxation. Any opinions expressed are those of the author and
not those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.NBER Working Paper #1025
November 1982
The Theory of Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation
Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to present the chronological development of
the concept of excess burden and the related study of optimal tax theory. A
main objective of this exercise is to uncover the interrelationshipsamong
various apparently distinct results, so as to bring out the basic structure
of the entire problem.
The paper includes a discussion of various measures of excess burden,
focusing on issues of approximation, informational requirements, aggregation
over individuals, and the effects of technology. Included in the presentation
of optimal tax theory is a section on tax reform, as well as an application
of the theory to the case where uncertainty is present.
Alan J. Auerbach
Department of Economics
Harvard University
Cambridge, MA 02138
(617) 495—39341. Introduction
The theory of excess burden and optimal commodity taxation isone of the
oldest subjects of study- in public finance, dating back toDupuit (i844), and
yet is also closely associated w.th the rapid analytical development of the
field which commenced in the early l970s. Perhapsmore than in most areas of
economics, there has been a tendency to overlook contributions nade in earlier
decades. As a result, much of the "new" public economics of the lastdecade
amounts to little more than a restatement and extension,perhaps in less arcane
language and terminology, of previously proven propositions. In somecases, the
modern effort is less general in scope than the original.
Probably the most celebrated example of such "rediscovery" is that of Ram-
sey's (1927) derivation of optimal comndity tax formulae, now referred toas
the Ramsey rule. The lapse here is even harder to understand in thatRamsey's
results were succinctly described in Pigou's classic public financetext (1947)
and rederived by Boiteaux (1956). However, this is notan isolated event. The
deadweight loss "triangles" nE.de popular by the work of Harberger (1964)were
considered by Hotelling (1938), and appear implicitly inDipuit (i844):
It follows that when the change in consumption brought aboutby a
tax is known, it is possible to find anupper limit to the amount
of the utilitr lost by multiplying the change in consumptionby half the tax.
Indeed, the generalization of such excess burden formulae by Boiteaux (1951) and
2 Debreu (1951, 1954) has until recently been almost entirelyignored in the sub-
sequent literature. Even the "Laffer curve", popular among noneconomists,might
more appropriately be called the "Dupuit curve":
If a tax is gradually increased from zeroup to a point where it
becomes prohibitive, its yield is at first nil, then increasesby
small stages until it reaches a naximum, after which itgradually
declines until it becomes zero a€ain. It follows that when the
state requires to raise a given sum by means of taxation, thereare
always two rates of tax which would fulfill the requirement, one—1.2—
above and one below that which would yield the maximum. There may
be a very great difference between the amounts of3utility lost
through these taxes which yield the same revenue.
One can only imagine how recent U.S. history would have been altered-had Ilipuit
written this on a napkin.
The purpose of this chapter is to present, absent lateral or backward
steps, the chronological development of the concept of excess burden and the
related study of optimal tax theory. A main objective of this exercise is to
uncover the interrelationships among various apparently distinct results, so as
to bring out the basic structure of the entire problem.
1.1 Outline of the Chapter
Any discussion of welfare economics inevitably begins with the problem of
welfare measurement, which in the present context involves a treatment of Mar-
shall's consumers' surplus and its relationship to Hicks' (l92) notions of com-
pensating and equivalent variations. These are discussed in Section 2, where
special attention is paid to the distinction between the measurement of the wel-
fare effects of price changes and the distortionary impact of tax changes. Sec-
tion 3 develops the various measures of excess burden, focusing on issues of
approximation, informational requirements and aggregation over individuals, and
the effects of a more general technolo than the commonly supposed one with
fixed producer prices. Section 1 reviews some of the empirical attempts to
estimate various deadweight losses. Section 5 presents and interprets the basic
rules for optimal commodity taxation, including a discussion of the role of pro-
fits taxation and the desirability of production efficiency. The analysis in
Section 6 concerns the relative desirability of direct and indirect taxation and
the structure of individual preferences. Section 7 presents some applications—1.3—
of optimaltaxtheory to questions such as the provision of public goods, cor-
rection of externalities, and the allocation of risk.Finally, in Section 8,we
explore the issue of tax reform, as distinct from de novo taxdesign. This
literature dates back to Corlett and Hague (1953—it), and askswhether specified
local movements away from an initial suboptimalequilibrium will improve social
welfare. In general, movement of prices in the directionof their optimal
levels does not guarantee such an improvement.2.Measures of Surplus and Excess Burden
2.1 Consumers' Surplus and the Hicksian variations
We begin with Marshall's (1920, p. 811) diagram, in Figure 2.1, depicting
consumers' and producers' surplus. The consumers' surplus is defined, somewhat
vaguely, to be the amount that consumers would pay in excess of the amount they
are paying, p0x0, for the amount they are purchasing,x0. Interpreting the
demand curve as an expression of willingness to pay, we obtain area A as such a
measure. Similarly, interpreting producers' surplus as the level of profits
received in supplying the quantity sold, and assuming that competitive supply
causes the marginal social cost to coincide with the supply schedule S, we ob-.
tam the area B. The sum A +Bis maximized when price equals marginal cost,
as one would hope, and changes in each measure following from a price change are
easily calculated. For example, if the price rises fromp0 to p1, the change in
consumers' surplus is the area of a trapazoid which equals
p
S =1
1
x(p) dp (2.1)
p0
where x() is the demand function with respect to the good's own price, holding
other prices fixed.
The basicproblem with consumers'surplus as a welfare measure is that if
morethanone price changes, the order in which the trapezoids in (2.1) are cal-
culated matters. That is, if we let x1 and p' be the quantity demanded and
price in the th market, the sum of individual consumers' surpluses AS1, i.e.
the line integral:
p
s =s'=I''
x1 dp1 (2.2)
i 1Producers
Surplus
Figure 2.1
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takes on different values according to the path of integration from the initial
price vector to the ultimate price vector.
Tosee this, consider a simple
example with twomarkets.If we change the price in market 1 first, the change
in surplus is:
1 2
p p
A S1 =1fx(p ,p0)dp
+2' x (p1, p dp 2.3a
p0 p0
while if we change the price in market 2 first, we obtain:
A S2 = x1(p1, p)dp1 +21x2(p, p2)dp2
(2.3b)
p0 p0
Subtracting A S1 from A S2, we obtain:
1
ri1 211 2 1 A S2 —AS1 = Lx(p ,p1)
—x(p ,p0)ldp
p0
2
2, 1 2 2, 12i2 / — LXp1,
j— Pijdp 2.
p0
For this term to equal zero, it imist generally be zero over all subintervals
betweenand .Inparticular, for small changes in p1 and p2, with
p =p+dpand p1 =
p0
+dp,(2.1)becomes:
1,1 2 21 2
3x 'po, 123 (p0, 12 A —AS1 = 2 dp dp — 1 dp dp (2.5)
ap
which equals zero only if the cross price derivative and —-areequal.
ap ip
Such symmetryholdsfor compensated demands: the Slutsky matrix is symmetric
(Hicks 196). However, ordinary demand derivatives also possess income effects.
For the income effects to be equal, it is straightforward to show, budget shares
must be constant, i.e., preferences must be homothetic.One solution to this ambiguity,then,is to define a. surplus measure in
termsofthe compensated commodity demands for which the symmetry property
holds. Here, however, we face a different question: since utility does change
with the change in prices, which utility level should be used as a reference
level for the compensated demand functions? The problem is one of index nuni—
bers, and twonaturalcandidates are the levels of utility prevailing before
and after the price changes. Following Hicks (191.42), we define the compensating
variation of a price change to be that amount of income the consumer must
receive to leave utility unaffected by the price change, and the equivalent
variationas the amountof income the consumer would forego to avoid the price
change. By definition, the compensating variation of a price change from
to equals the equivalent variation of a change fromp to .Usingthe
expenditure function, defined by the minimization of expenditure at given prices
to satisfy a given level of utility:
E (p, ) mm(px)subject to U(x) ) 0 (2.5)
wemayexpressconcisely the equivalent and compensating variations as
E (p, 0)E(p0),where0isthe pre—change utility level in the case of the
compensating variation, and the post—change utility level in the case of the
equivalent variation. Letting y be the consumer's actual income, we can express
these two measures as functions of prices and income alone through use of the
indirect utility function, V(p, y), defined by
V(p, y) =maxU(x) subJect to p •x y (2.6)
Substituting(2.6) into(2.5), we obtain for the compensating variation of a
pricechange fromto—2.5—
cv(,p)
=E(,v(, y) )
—E(,v(, y)
=E(,v(, T)) — (2.Ta)
and for the corresponding equivalent variation:
Ev(, )= E(,v(, y)) -E(,v(, y))
=y-E(,v(, y)) (2.m)
(where we use the identity y =E(p,V(p, y) ))
Thesemeasures maybedepicted graphically. By the envelope theorem (Shepard's
Lemma),thederivative of the expenditure function with respect to an individual
price p1 is simply the Hicksian or compensated demand x(p, U).Thus,either
of the Hicksian variations my be expressed (for the appropriate value of U)as:
E(, U)- E(,U)= f1(p,U).dp x(p, U)dp (2.8)
Since the cross—price derivatives are symmetric for compensated demands, these
measures are path—independent. For the case of a single price change, they
may be easily compared to the simple change in consumers' surplus, which is
then well—defined. This is shown in Figure 2.2, where D(U) is the compensated
demand curve corresponding to the compensated demands x(p, U), drawn irre
steeply than the ordinary demand curve D under the assumption of normality.
The ordinary consumers' surplus changes by the area A +Bwith an increase
in price from p0 to p1. The compensating variation of the change equals
the area A +B+C,while the equivalent variation equals the area A. The
bracketing of the Marshallian measure by the two Hicksian measures was
emphasizedby Hicks(1912)andWilhig(19T6)intheir attempts at rehabilitationp
p1
p0
Figure 2.2
Compensating and Equivalent Variations
I
x
DcOl(P]. y)) Dc(V(po, y))
A
I
k
x(p1, y) x(p0, y)—2.7—
of consumers' surplus as a welfare measure. However, theirargument becomes
weaker when more than one price changes, for then consumers'surplus is not even
single—valued. Moreover, for estimating the excess burden of a tax, it is not
the entire loss to the consumer in which we are interested but ratherthe loss
in excess of revenue collected. It turns out that in sucha case, the felici-
tous outcome with respect to the relative size.s of the threemeasures no longer
holds.
2.2 Definitions of Excess Burden
The deadweight loss from a tax system is that amount that is lost inexcess
of what the government collects. Unfortunately, while this definition makesin-
tuitive sense, it is too vague to permit a single interpretation.
Beginning again with the basic Marshallian approach, we can see the effects
of a tax t in Figure 2.3. By raising the consumer price fromp0 to p1 + t, the
tax reduces consumers' surplus by the area A + B. Producers'surplus is reduced
by C + D, by the drop in producer price top1, but tax revenues amount only to
A + C, yielding a social loss of B + D, or approximately 1/ t(x0 —
x1)
=—l,t x,
as suggested by Dupuit.
A key aspect of this measure is that it is greater than zero whether the
tax is positive or negative. The case of a subsidy at rate s is depicted in
Figure 2.4. Here, there is an increase in consumption tox1, and consumers'
surplus and producers' surplus both rise, by the areas H + I and F + G,respec—
tively. But the amount of the subsidy exceeds those gains by the area J, equal
to 1/2 Sx or, again, _1/2 t zxfor t—s being the algebraic value of the tax.
The loss comes from the distortion of a Pareto optimal allocation, not simply
the reduction in output.Figure 2. 3
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For the case where a tax already exists, wemay ask what additional excess
burden would be caused by a tax increase. In thiscase, we subtract the change
in government revenue from the change in producers' and consumers'surplus,
since revenue is positive at the initial point. Theresulting rrasure is shown
in Figure 2.5.
By raising the consumer price from
p1
+
t1
to
p2
+
t2,
the tax causes a
loss in consumers' surplus of A +B.Producers' surplus declines by C +D,and,
as before, the government collects additional revenue on the purchases
x2 equal
to (t2 —t1)
x2, or areas A +C.However, the goverrinient loses the revenue it
was collecting on the purchases in excess ofx2, equal to area E. Thus, the
welfare loss of the tax increase equals the trapezoidal area B +E+D,or
approximatej..y —(tx +1/2tx).. Thus, even ift is very siiall, the addi-
tional excess burden need not be, unlike in the case whereno tax exists
initially: there is now a first order welfare loss resulting from marginal tax
changes.
Unfortunately, we have already seen that consumers' surplus possesses
problems as a welfare measure, so it is not clear how inforrative these results
are, particularly if we wish to consider the effects of several taxes at once.
It turns out that more sophisticated asures based on the 1-ticksianvariations
offer results which do not qualitatively differ from theones we have already
obtained.However, this renins tobe demonstrated. For the remainder of this
subsection,we focus onthe case of a single consumer facing fixed producer pri-
ces. These restrictions are relaxed in Section3.
Usingthe equivalent variation, Mohring (l9Tl)suggeststhat the excess
burden of a tax is the amount in excess of taxes being collected that thecon-
sumer would give up to return to a no—tax state; that is, how much more could be
collected from the consumer (and thrown away) than iscurrently being collected,Figure 2.5
Excess Burden with a Preexisting Tax
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with no loss in utility, if the Collection method waslumpsum taxation. In the
terminolor used above, we may write this measure as:
EBE =E(,v(,y))-E(,v(p, y)J -R(,y)
=y-E(,v(, y)) -( - x(p,y) (2.9)
where B (,y)is the tax revenue collected when prices are at and the con-
sumer's income equals y.
Alternately, Diamond and McFadden (19Th) suggest the use of the compen— -
satingvariation by defining excess burden to be that amount, in addition to
revenues collected, that the government must supply to the consumer to allow him
to maintain the initial utility level. That is, how much must come from "out-
side" the system to compensate for the tax distortion. To avoid double—
counting, we include in the government's revenue the additional amount it col—
lects because the individual is compensated and (for a normal good) demands more
of the taxed commodity. Thus, the Diamond—McFadden measure may be written:
EBc =E(,v(, y)) —E(, v(,y)) —R(,E(, v(, y)))
=E(,v(,y))—y—( — ) x(,E(, v(, y) ID
= E(,v(,y))—y—( — ) v(,y)) (2.10)
(where the last step uses the identity x(p, E(p, )) = x(p, Ufl.
Fora single price change, these two measures of excess burden may be
graphically compared to the Marshallian nasure shown in Figure 2.3. The three
measures together are showninFigure 2.6. To obtain the equivalent variation
measure or the consumers' surplus measure of excess burden, we subtract the
revenue actually collected at x(p, y) from the respective measures shown in
Figure 2.2. For the compensating variation measures, we subtract the revenueV(p0, y))
Figure 2.6
A Comparison of Excess Burden Measures
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thatwould be collected if utility were kept at V(p, y). This yields the areas
A, A +B,and C for the three respective rasures. Note that the two Hicksian
measures no longer bracket the Marshallian one.6 If the taxed good is normal,
the latter is necessarily larger than each of the former, and the discrepancy
may be quite large.
Other logical measures of excess burden involving the equivalent and corn-
pensating variations may be conceived.7 In addition, it is easy to adapt the
two measures already derived to the case where the initial equilibrium is not
Pareto optimal but is already distorted by taxes. The equivalent variation
measure of additional excess burden would then be the amount, in excess of addi-
tional tax revenues, that the consumer would pay to avoid the latest price
increase from p to p
EBE =E(,V(p, y))
—
EIp.,V(p,y))—
ER(p,y)
—
R(p,E(p,V(p, y)))1
=y-E(,T(p,y))-(-p).
(p2,
y) +x(p,v(,y))
=y—E(,v(, y))
—(. ) x('
y) +(p—p)
(L1,v(,y) )— x(,y))) (2.11)
Comparing(2.11)with (2.9), we find that (2.11) contains an additional expression
representing the reduction in tax revenues as demand declines with the new rise in
price, with utility held. constant at v(, y). This additional term corresponds to
that found for the basic consumers' surplus measure in Figure 2.6. Likewise, the
compensating variation rrasure would be the amount in excess of the change in reve-
nues that would be required to to maintain the initial utility level, or:—2.15—
EBc =E(,v(,y))—E(,v(j,y)J-[R(,E1, y)))—R(,y)]
=E(, V(:1,y)) —y- — v(,y))+( - ,(p,y)
=E(,v(,---22'v(,y))
+( — y)—x(p,v(,y))) (2.12)
where the additional term compared to (2.10) is the revenue lost as demand
declines with utility held constant at v(,y).3.Evaluating the Measures of Excess Burden
3.1 Taylor Approximations and InformationalRequirements
For purposes of explosition, it is sometimes easierto express the dead-
weight loss calculations above in terms of second—orderTaylor approximations.
For example, if we expand the exactmeasure EBc around the initial price vector
we obtain:
dEB dEB
EBc =dp
•- )+1/2( -dp'
-+ ...(3.1)
which, ignoring all terms beyond the second order, yields:
EB0[-(-)'.1 ()
dx d2x
/ \r —c ____ + 1/2 —
I — —
dp
— 3.2
where x., is evaluated at p and V(p,y).If we make a further approxi—
2
mation ignoring the cuature terms of the compensated demand inction
we obtain:
EBc— (t' St +1/2t' St) =—(t' x+1/2t x) (3.3)
where t =(— ),t=(— ),S= isthe Slutsky matrix, and
and =S t.
This is of a form similar to the single market measure derivedabove for simple
consumers' surplus, but the changes in demand are nowcompensated changes rather—3.2—
than ordinary ones. The approximation in (3.3) is that originally derived by
Harberger (1964), although the procedure used to derive it here is somewhat
8
simpler.
From (3.3), we may observe a number of additional characteristics of tax—
induced excess burden. First of all, when there are pre—existing taxes in other
markets, the introduction of another tax need not worsen things. We must weigh
the strictly positive term —(t)2S..for the new tax in market i against the
cross effects -.t S t in each other market j, which represent the loss in
revenue from the tax t. due to the drop in demand resulting from the price
increase in market i.Since S.. may be positive or negative, so may each of
those terms.In general, if pre—existing taxes are on goods substitutable for
good i (S.. >0),the new tax is more likely to lessen the total excess burden
of the tax system.
A second observation to make from (3.3) is that excess burden is a non-
linear function of tax rates. Consider, for example, a single tax t. imposed
upon a state without taxes. The excess burden is approximately —1/2tS.., so
that it increases with the square of the tax. This suggests that to raise a
certain amount of revenue, we should use several small taxes rather than few
large ones, perhaps tilting toward those with smaller own substitution effects
for which the scale of excess burden is lower. However, once several taxes are
used, the cross effects just discussed need also be evaluated. How these
aspects fit together will become clearer in Section 5 when we formally consider
the optimal tax problem.
Aside from expositional purposes, the use of a ylor approximation can
only be justified on grounds of insufficient information. If we know the
consumer's expenditure function, we can calculate either of the exact measures
of excess burden explicitly. Even if we know only the consumer's ordinary—3.3—
demandfunction, we can solve for his indirect utility function and hence his
compensated demand function (in principle) using the system of partial differ-
ential equations generated by Roy's identity:9
dtJ/d
x(p, y) =— (3.1)
dU/dy
Thus, we imist know less than the consumer's demand function ifwe are to justify
the use of an approximation; perhaps only its localproperties. However, even
in this case, it is probably preferable to constructan exact measure to the
extent of one's limited knowledge of demand characteristicsaway from the ini-
tial equilibrium, and use confidence bounds basedon the precision of ourunder-
lying parameter estimates.
A second defense of the use of approximationsor even of simple consumers'
surplus measures is that the demand function as estimated is notintegrable, so
that we cannot use the procedure suggested above to derive theassociated com-
pensated demand function. However, lack of integrability issynononus with the
violation of the laws of demand.If such laws are violated, what interpretation
can we give any measure we use?
3.2 Variations in Producer Prices
The assumption made thus far in this section that producerprices are fixed
is a common one in the literature, but may do violence toour representation of
the actual situation prevailing in theeconormj-. For example, we know that a tax
on a goodin absolutely fixed supply isequivalent to a lump sum tax and there-
fore nondistortionary,regardless of how elastic the demand for the good is.
Our preliminary examination of excess burden using consumers'surplus in Sec-
tion 2 suggested that the excess burden of a tax isproportional to the reduc-
tion in the output of the taxed good, taking account of both demand andsupply—3. 1 —
conditions.It would be useful to extend the Hicksian measures in thesame
direction.
The complication that arises in doing so is that it isno longer sufficient
to posit a certain money value of compensation: sinceproducer prices change,
the form of compensation matters. For example, to extend thecompensating vari-
ation measure of excess burden, we rmist specify the form in whichthe coxnperisa—
tion from "outside" the system, in excess of collectedrevenue, will come.
To develop a compensating variation measure of the additionalexcess burden
caused by an increase in taxes, starting at a distortedequilibrium, we let a
be the compensation vector of the elements ofx, normalized so that at initial
prices ct has a cost of unity, and 8 the scalar that determines how much of the
compensation bundle the consumer receives, 8a .Ifwe denote producer prices by
q and consumer prices by p, then the compensating variation measure of excess
burden 8canbe defined implicitly by the equation
Y(2, y2
- + a8)=V(,y1) (3.5)
where is the initial consumer price vector, the distorted price vector,
and the corresponding producer price vectors,y1 and the lump sum
incomein the two states, and =( — x(p,y1) and R2 =( —
. V(,y1))the revenue in the two states. The values of y are indexed
by their respective states because they may vary when producer prices change.
For example, if the econoimj's production function exhibitsdecreasing returns to
scale in the consumer goods x, then the pure profits fromcompetitive production
are positive and change with the change in producer prices. Letting zbe the
vector of goods produced, total profits are y =qz. Note that production and
consumption differ by the infusion of additional compensation, 8
It is not generally possible to find a closed form solution for 8 from its
implicit definition in (3.5). However, we can consider the change in 8 result-
ing from an increase in taxes starting at the initial equilibriumby calculating-.3.5—
the total differential of (3.5), evaluated at that point and thensolving for
d. Doing so, we obtain:
dp +4 dq+ dq+d8czq +t.dx +xdtl 0 (3.6)
wheret=(p—q).
Again using the evelope theorem, one can show that =z.Using this and
dq
Roy's identity ((3.I) above), we obtain from (3.6):
[—x .dp+z.dq+$c.dq+dci.q+t•dx+x.dt]=0 (3.7)
But since x =y+8aand 0, and by the normalization q •a=1,(3.7)
simplifies to
=—t
•dx (3.8)
which is precisely the form of the first—order effect derived above in (3.3).
However, here dx is the change in x as taxes rise, holding utility constant and
compensating with the bundle •Becausethe choice of a affects the equili-
brium,it affects dx and hence d. For example,consider the case in which
thereare two goods, one of which is taxed. Let the untaxed good serve as nu—
rneraire,so that its price does not change. Then we can represent the effect of
the compensation bundle in a graph showing the demand for the taxed good. This
is done in Figure 3.1. The supply curve S represents the relative producer
price of x, and depends only on the amount of x produced. The demand curve tra-
ces out the compensated demand for the taxed good, which is a function of the
good's own price alone in this two—good case. With the introduction of a tax t
to a previously undistorted equilibrium, the change in x depends on whether the
compensation is in the numeraire good or the taxed good. In the former case, x
declines to x2. In the latter case, less of the taxed good is produced becauseFigure 3.1
Excess Burden with Changing Producer Prices
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of the excess burden. This can be represented by a second supply curve S',
which accounts for the fact that total supply exceeds production. (Note that S'
will lie to the right of S except at the undistorted price.) The result is a
smaller decline in x, to x. Thus, with producer prices changing, an additional
ambiguity is added to the measurement of excess burden.
We can also derive the second—order effect onof a change in the tax vec-
tor t by taking the total differential of (3.7). This yields
—dt •dx—dadq —tdx
which, even if we ignore the last curvature term, has an additional term, com-
pared to the second—order effect in (3.3), caused by the changing value of the
normalized compensation bundle. If all compensation is in the form of the
numeraire good, or if there are no taxes initially, this term also vanishes and
weare left with the more familiar second order effect.1
Another familiarexpression for the second—order effect may be derived from
(3.9). Again ignoringthe last curvature term, we use the fact that x = z
toobtain:
—dp•dx+dqdz =—dpS dp +dqHd (3.10)
d2ydz
where H is the Hessian of the profit function—f= — .
dq
This expression for the second—order effect of a change in taxes on welfare was
first developed by Boiteaux (1951), although his derivation was limited to the
case where the initial equilibrium is undistorted and the first—order effect
d vanishes.—3.8—
Usingthe notion of equivalent variation,wecan construct a measure by
asking what level of resources can be extracted from the consumer in excess of
additional revenue to avoid an additional tax increase. This yields the follow-
ing implicit definition of :
v(,y2)
=v(,1
—
(R2
—
R1)
— (3.11)
where, in this case, state 2 is the actual state with taxes at t, whereas
state 1 is the hypothetical state in which taxes do not rise frombut income
is reduced to yield the same level of utility as prevails in state 2. Here,
(i—s) is related to Debreu's (1951) coefficient of resource utilization, which
he defines to be the proportion of society's resources that would be necessary
to maintain each individual's current level of utility if all distortions were
removed. Ourmeasurediffers in that we consider the marginal change, rather than
removal of a distortion, and let the vector a be arbitrary. (Of course, Debreu's
measure is defined relative to all kinds of distortions leading to an inefficient
allocation, not just tax—induced changes in the prices of consumer goods.) As
before, we cannot solve forexplicitly, but we can calculate the first—order and
second—order effects d and d2 at the initial distorted point. We leave further
discussion of this measure to the next subsection, which deals with aggregation over
consumers.
3.3 Aggregation and Welfare Comparisons
Thus far, we have defined all our measures of excess burden for the case of
a single individual. They are easily generalized to the case of several identi-
cal individuals. However, matters become more complicated if we wish to allow
for differences in individual tastes, or even differences in income among other-
wise identical individuals.—3.9—
Exceptunder very strict conditions on preferences, any measure of aggre—
gate excess burden will depend on the initial distribution of income. Consider
the case of fixed producer prices examined in Section 2, and define a measure of
aggregate excess burden, using the compensating variation, as the amount that
must come from outside the system to maintain each consumer at his pre—tax level
of utility. For two individuals, this measure equals (compare to 2.10):
lc 1 1 1 2, 2 2 1 2 LE ,V(,y)j—y +E
(p1, V (p0,y )j —(y+y
11 2r2 2 —( - ) V(,y)j+ V(p, y ) 3.l2
where superscripts index the consumers 1 and 2.
Supposenow that the initial income distribution is changed by a small
reduction in 1 and an equal size increase in y. The change in L would be:
3E1 3V1 3E2av2
3x1av1 ax2i2 —i—(—) (3.13)
which, using the fact that x r r CL, yI) -x,E, y1 j,
canbe rewritten:
3E1 3V1+aE2 3V2 dL----- ---
ax1 1 1 ax2 2 2
— —
(—. -— .
-—
+ . --— . --—) 3. 1—3.10—
Since E[, v(, y) )= y,we may rewrite (3.1I) as:
"1 dx1 dx2
dL =—-(1
—(P—o))(i
—Pi—P0)
i i 1 3E ( 1 1 1dE 1 1 where i =-— , V(ps, y )) andii =——
V(ps, y )arethe marginal
expenditures needed per unit of increased utility at base utility level
v1(, y1) and price levelsand ,respectively.Thus, dL will equal zero,
in general, only if two conditions are met:
(1) equals some common function of prices alone (not income) for
lii
the two individuals; and
1
dx
(2)the vector of income effects ----equalssome common function of
prices alone.
Condition (2) implies that ordinary demand functions take the form:
1 i 1, 1
x (p, y ) = p) + O(p)y (3.16)
for some functions (.)ande(), the latter common across individuals. (The
laws of consumer demand imply, in turn, that 41() is homogeneous of degree 0 in
prices and (.)ishomogeneous of degree —l in prices, since a proportional
change in and y can't affect x1().) The demand function specified in (3.16)
corresponds to the well—known Gorman (1953) "polar form", which plays a central
role in the theory of exact aggregation.
Condition (1) implies that, for a suitable transfoimation of the utility
function, consumer i's expenditure function can be written:
E1(p,tJ') =ô'(p) +i(p) (3.17)—3.11—
(with &()andy() homogeneous of degree 1 in prices). This is the expendi-
ture function corresponding to the Gorman polar form (see Muellbauer 1976),so
that conditions (1) and (2) are each satisfied if and only if preferences satis-
fy this very restricted pattern that allows variations from identical homothetic
preferences only through individual—specific displacements through the "basic
needs" function of zero—income consumption, 41(.)•
Note that even identical preferences, if not homothetic, will suffice. For
example, suppose individuals have an inelastic demand for a commodity at high
incomes but an elastic demand at low incomes. Then the excess burden of a tax
on this good will be increased if we transfer income to the poorer individual,
for this will increase the overall demand elasticity for the taxed good. Thus,
any measure of excess burden we envisage is not independent of the income
distribution. Similarly, if we required not that each individual's utility be
kept constant, but that individual 1 receive one dollar less than would be
necessary, this, too, would affect the aggregate measure for the same reason.
Of course, it is still possible to define measures of excess burden for the
multi—individual case. For example, we nay implicitly define a compensating
variation measure analogous to (3.5)bythe identities:
v'(, (y2 +
-
R1
+)= V1(p,Wy1)
Vi (3.18)
where i indexes the individual, is individual i's actual profit share, and
is the share needed to maintain each individual on the same indifference
curve as prices rise to and the extra compensation vector
•"enters" the
system. For the equivalent variation, the measure forcorresponding to (3.11)
for several individuals is
Wy2) =V1(,w(y1
-
R2+ R1.- )) (3.19)—3.12—
Again, itisnot generally possible to solve explicitly forin either case,
butwe canderive expressions for the first—order and second—order effects
d and d28 by totally differentiating (3.18) or (3.19) for each i and then
adding over i, making use of the adding—up constraint on the profit shares w
While the resulting expressions for the compensating variation measure are
essentially the same as those described in Subsection 3.2 (with aggregate
demands replacing individual ones), aninterestingresult occurs in the second—
order effect derived from the measure defined by (3.19). It contains an addi-
tional term reflecting the indirect impact of taxes on excess burden through the
change in the income distribution in state 1 (Debreu 195k). Since for an equiv-
alent variation measure state 1 is simply a hypothetical state based on the
utility levels in state 2, changes in taxes, even starting at a no tax position,
influence the distribution of real income in state 1.Indeed, it should not be
surprising that the condition required for this extra term to vanish is the same
one required above for excess burden to be independent oftheinitial income
distribution.
Thereis a temptation to respond to this dependency of excess burden on the
distribution of income by conceptually separating questions of allocation and
distribution,following Musgrave's (1959) framework for the different "branches"
of government: let the distribution branch worry about distribution, and the
allocation branch concern itself with minimizing excess burden. However, there
are two problems with this approach. First, if the distribution branch is not
in operation, we cannot obtain well—behaved social welfare prescriptions by coim-
paring levels of excess burden in different allocations through the device known
as the compensation principle: one state being preferred to another if winziers
could compensate losers. Unless such compensation actually occurs, the
orderings coming out of such a procedure need not be well—behaved or consistent—3.13—
with any particular social welfare function. This is the essence of the criti-
que of the Hicks (191O)-Kaldor (1939) approach to welfare economics (Samuelson,
19b7).
A second response might be that we are only interested in efficiency, not
distribution, and so will assign equal distributional weights to individuals,
thereby allowing the interpretation of the aggregate measures derived above as
"efficiency—only" social welfare measures. Such is the approach suggested by
Harberger (1971). Unfortunately, this won't work either. We can certainly ima-
gine a social welfare function of the form:
1 H
w(U ,..., u)= (3.20)
and can even choose a normalization for the individual utility functions so
that, in the initial state, the marginal utility of income and hence the social
marginal utility of income for each individual is one. However, once prices
change, as they will when taxes are introduced, the changes in real income, and
hence the marginal utility of income, will generally be different. Thus, for
our measure of excess burden to correspond to a social welfare function, it
would require price—dependent individual weights, even if the weights were ini-
tially equal. Only when preferences satisfy the Gorman conditions will weights
initially set equal reqniain equal in all cases (Roberts 1980). Thus, we are
free to consider our aggregate measures of excess burden to be measures of effi-
ciency. However, it will generally not be possible to make welfare comparisons
on the basis of such measures, no matter what our attitude is about the relative
importance of equity and efficiency.. TheEmpirical Measurement of Excess Burden
The ultimate value of the theory developed in Sections 2 and 3 is in its
application to measuring real world distortions. This section offers a brief
review of some of the research that has been done in this popular area of
investigation. No attempt will be made to provide an exhaustive summary of the
empirical literature on the measurement of excess burden.
4.i Measurement with Taylor Approximations
The earliest empirical work on the measurement of excess burden was done by
Harberger, in a series of papers. In each case, he applied the second order
Taylor approximation (3.3), implicitly derived from the compensating variation
measure of excess burden, for the case in which there are no pre—existing taxes.
An example of this research may be found in Harberger (1961), which considers
the welfare cost of a progressive tax on labor income by- individual income
classes. Treating capital as a factor supplied by households in static model,
Harberger (1966)consideredthe deadweight loss from the production distortion
caused by differential taxation of the return to capital in the corporate and
noncorporate sectors. Nontax distortions, such as those caused by monopolistic
pricing, can also be analyzed using standard excess burden formulae (Harberger
l95)-). One can also analyze the intertemporal allocation distortion caused by
capital income taxes by thinking of consumption in different periods as dif-
ferent comnditjes (Feidstein 1978).
Aside from the use of the Thylor approximation, a weakness typical of most
of this early work (excluding, of course, Harberger's piece on the corporate
income tax) was the assumption of fixed producer prices. With a convex produc-
tion frontier, changes in production prices would normally act to lessen theexcess burden caused by a tax increase. An example of the sensitivity of
assumption about production parameters maybefound in Chamley (1981) with
respect to the excess burden of capital income taxation.
1.2 Exact Measures
As stressed in Section 3, there is rarely a situation in which Taylor ap-
proximationsneed be used in place of exact measures based on the Hicksian vari-
ations. Thispoint is stressed by a number of authors (including Auerbach and
Rosen1980 and Hausman 1981a). For marrsystemsof denEnd functions (such as the
linear expenditure system discussedin Section 6)itis easy to recover the par-
ameters ofthe expenditure function from estimated ordinary demand functions.
Moreover,one can also use the standard errors of such estimates to place con-
fidence bounds on the excess burden measures themselves (Hausman 1981a).
Several recent studies have used exact measures to calculate the excess
burden of taxation. For example, Rosen (1978) considered the excess burden of
wage taxation using a linear expenditure system estimated froma cross—section.
Oneof the additional benefits of the "exact" approach to measuring dead-
weight loss is that it can readily be generalized to allow for changes in
income. That is, we can deduct from changes in the expenditure function not
only changes in revenue, but changes in income, to calculate the excess burden
of a tax system that changes individual incomes as well as the prices of some
commodities. For example, the compensating variation measure (2—10) would
become:
EBc =E(,v(,y0)
)— y—(p—p)4:(:l v(,r0)
) (li..l)
where y0 is income in the undistorted state and y is income in the distorted
state. This tool is particularly useful for the analysis of progressive taxes,—4.3—
whereindividuals behave as if they faced a proportional tax equal to the actual
marginal rate, with the inframarginal excess in collections that results being
assigned to lump sum income. For example, consider the case of a progressive
labor income tax in a two—good model. The individual's before—tax and after—tax
budget lines are represented in Figure .l. If the individual chooses point A,
we may pretend that he did so in response to a proportional tax at rate
—w)/w0and lump sum income of If he chooses point B, we could imagine
a proportional tax of (w0 —
wB)Iwoand lump sum income of Thistechnique has
been used in labor supply estimation and excess burden calculation by Hausnian
(l981b). King (1982b) has used the equivalent variation analogue of (4.l), which
he calls the "equivalent gain," to evaluate the effects of changes in housing
policy in the U.K.
An additional extension possible with exact measures is the case of
discrete choices, such as the decision to work or to purchase a durable good.
Suppose there are two regimes among which a consumer must choose. The general
rnethodolor for calculating excess burden is, as before, to equate utility
changes from distortionary and lump sum taxation, and conare the tax revenue.
However, the changes in utility take account of switches in regime that may
occur in each case. This is a straightforward calculation when the consumer's
indirect utility function is known, for it is simple to identify the regime cho-
sen in any situation. However, if one wishes to use approximation formulae, one
must take expelicit account of the effect of taxes on the probability of switch-
ing regimes. (See Small and Rosen 1981). An example of excess burden calcula-
tions with discrete decision variables is the analysis of housing subsidy pro—
grams by Venti and Wise (1982), in which indivudals must decide whether to nve
or stay, and face different budget constraints in the two situations.Labor
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4.3 SimulationMethods
Ultimately,thereare limitations on the extent to which we can obtain
closed form solutions for excess burden. This is particularly true of general
equilibrium calculations, for we must solve explicitly for the changes in pro-
ducer prices consistent with changes in consumer behavior. A solution to this
problemis the simulation model, in. which explicit parameterizations of pre-
ferences and technolor are mde and actual equilibria calculated. It is then
straightforwardto estimate changes in utility caused by a change in tax regime,
or the resources one could extract or must add to compensate for a given change.
The latter type of calculation corresponds to the price—varying excess burden
measurescited in Section 3.An early example of the use of simulation tech-
nique is Shoven's (1976) reconsideration of the excess burden caused by the cor-
porate income tax. In more recent work, Auerbach, Kotlikoff and Skinner (1981)
use a perfect foresight, overlapping generations growth model to analyze the
effect on different cohorts of individuals of various dynamic tax changes, such
as an unannounced switch from income taxation to consumption taxation.5. TheTheory of Optimal Taxation
xes distortbehavior and cause excess burden. How can this excess burden
bekept to a minimum whilegovernment simultaneously raises the revenue it
requires for public expenditures? This is the optimal tax problem, solved in
its basic form by Ramsey (1927).
Of course, there do exist nondistortionary taxes, at leasthypothetically.
Taxes on pure profits are just one form of such taxation. Theoptimal tax prob-
lem, in a sense, embodies the concession that such ideal taxesmay be difficult
to institute in practice. One might cite a number of reasons forthis, includ-
ing the political constraints on nonuniform taxation dependent on personal
characteristics. For example, we might succeed in having a nondistortionary and
progressive tax system by taxing according to genetic characteristics associated
with ability, but such schemes are typically proscribed.
In the next subsection, we present and interpret the basic, single individ-
ual optimal tax results, paying particular attention to the role of the
"untaxedt' numeraire commodity that is often a confusingpart of such analysis.
In Subsections 5.2 and 5.3,weshow how the results can be extended to allow for
profits and changing producer prices, and interpret the classic results of
Diamond and Mirlees (1971) and Stiglitz and sgupta (1971) concerning the
desirability of production efficiency in the presence of distortionary commodity
taxes. Subsection 5. discusses the relationship of the optimal tax solutionto
themeasures of excess burden described above.
5.1 Basic Optimal Tax Results
We imagine a representative consumer who has exogenous incomey, and faces
consumer prices p= (p0, p1, ••forthe commodities 0, 1, ...,N,which
have fixed producer prices q =(q0,q1, ...,q).Without any loss of general-
ity, we may choose good zero as the numeraire and set =1.—5.2--
The government may use unit excise taxes t =t0,t1 o..ton the goods
0, 1, ...,N,to raise a certain amount of required revenue, R. (We will relax
this ignorance of the expenditure side below.) Assumingtheconsumer maximizes
utility U(x) in the goods x, subject to the prices p and income y, we may ex—
press the optimal tax problem by:
max[max U(x)subject to px =y]subject to (p —q)x= R (5.1)
or, using the definition of the indirect utility function V():
max V(p, y) subject to (p -q)x =R (5.2)
Note that we specify the price vector, p, as our control rather than t,butd
this is a trivial distinction when the social cost vector q is fixed since =I
the identity matrix of order N +1.
The first-order conditions for the Lagrangian
V(p, y) -- (p-) xl (5.3)
are
dx
-Xx.+i[Et—-+x.l=0 V. (5.1) 1idp
1 1
whereA =isthe consumer's rginal utility of income. Condition (5.) may
be rearranged in a number of ways. Perhaps the most useful involves splitting
dx
the cross price effects —j-- using the Slutsky equation, and defining
dx
=A +E t. —-
tobe the marginal social utility of income (Diamond 1975), to obtain:—5.3—
— s t
=; a)x. (5.6)
wherethe S1s arecomponentsof the Slutsky matrix S. Thetermadiffers from
A because, in the presence of taxes, a dollar given to the individual increases
his utility directly by A and indirectly by the increased revenue. Since we can
interpretthe Lagrange multiplier ofthe revenue constraint, 1.1,asthe shadow
cost in terms of utility of raising an additional dollar of revenue, the indi-
rect gain of revenue added by increased expenditures out of an additional
dollar of income equals Et ,thesecond term in the definition of a
Theterm (— a)represents the difference between raising a dollar of
revenue at the actual margin and raising it through a direct taking of income
from the concern: the marginal excess burden of the tax. This term is always
non—negative (see section 8)andhence the terms —ES. t. are also non—
1J3
negative.
There is one potential solution to (5.6)thatwouldbe particularly attrac-
tive, for it involves no distortion. If we choose equal proportional ad valorem
taxes, or
t. = (5.7) 1 1 1
forsome constant 0, we obtain
—0E S.. =( — a) (5.8) 13j 1 1 1
ButE S. p4 equals ---J= 0for all i. (This is simply a statement of the
ii p.u
1
envelopetheorem.) Therefore, the system of equations in (5.8)issatisfied
for .i= aand hence no excess burden. Thus, proportional excise taxes would
appear to be the solution.—5. 1—
The reason such taxes are nondistortionary, however, is the keytotheir
q
limited applicability.Since p =q+t=+ = 1 o•Hence,the con—
sumer's budget coritraint becomes:
q
•x =yor q •x=y(l—0) (5.9)
where 0 is chosen to satisfy 0 =R/y.A system of equal excise taxes is nothing
morethan a tax onthe consumer' s exogeneous income, and hence a lump sumtax.
Ify =0,then no finite value of 0 will satisfy the revenue constraint,sowe
must ask when y will be nonzero.
First of all, y will be nonzero in general ifthereare decreasing returns
toscale in production (in a more general model not assuming fixed producer
prices). Even in the absence of pure profits, y will be nonzero if we interpret
itas "full incon" and the x vector as consumption rather than demand. For
example, suppose the x vector consists of two comndities, consumption, C, and
leisure,2., and that the consumer has a labor endowment, L. Without pure pro—
fits, the consumer's budget constraint in the absence of taxes ny be written
either as
C +(2.—L)=0 (5.lOa)
or
C +£=L (5.lob)
where labor is the riuxneraire and Cand are the amount andrelativeprice of con-
sumption. Interpretingthelabor comndity we can tax as net purchase of
leisure, (2. —L),we have no income y to tax through proportional excise taxes.
Interpretingthecommodity as consumption of leisure, 2., we can use the propro—
tional tax solution onC and£ to tax L indirectly. Hence, the inability to use—5.5—
proportional taxes to raise revenue is equivalent to the restriction to taxing
flows, rather than total consumption. Under this restriction, a proportional
tax raises no revenue (Baumol and Bradford 1970). Based on examples of this
sort, various authors have equated the need to use distortionary taxes with the
inability to tax leisure, but this is somewhat misleading on two counts: we can
tax leisure purchases (labor supply), and this restriction applies to anycom-
modity in which the consumer has an endowment.
Once we do restrict our taxes to net purchases, it is easiest to interpret
the vector x to be such flows rather than total consumption. In exchange for
the loss of a nondistortionary tax scheme, we gain an additional free norinali—
zation. Since the consumer's indirect utility function is homogeneous in prices
and income, and is now simply V(p) ,itis also homogeneous of degree zero in
prices. So is the revenue constraint, since, for any constant 4),
(4)p —q)x =( — 1)px+(p—q)x =(p—q)x (5.11)
Thus,we may choose any scale for p. It is customary to set p0 =1,thereby
making the nurieraire also the arbitrarily "untaxed" good. ¶Lrpically, in models
where there is a single factor supplied, labor, and several commodities
purchased, labor is chosen as this numeraire. While such a normalization is
innocuous and in no way affects the real characteristics of the outcome, it can
be very confusing: the untaxed good, labor, just happens to be the only good
with an endowment, L, that we can't tax independently of its consumption, 2.;
hence the loss of distinction between untaxable and untaxed goods. If we chose
corn as the untaxed good, labor would still have the untaxable endowment. This
distinction is important when one interprets the various rules now derived.—5.6—
We now have only N first—order conditions, from (5.6), having dropped that
corresponding to P. Hence, the strater of equal proportional taxes at rate
0 (with a zero tax on good zero, of course) now gives us the terms
—ez s. p. =0S. (5.12) ij j
onthe left—hand side of (5.6).Thiswill stand in constant proportion to x over
i, as required for a solution, only if the compensated cross—elasticity of demand
for each good i with respect to the price of good 0, cj=S0p0/x. =S0/X•
is the same for all i * 0. Thus, equal proportional taxes on all taxed goods
satisfy the first order conditions only if all goods are equally conlementary
(in the sense of Hicks l946) to the untaxed good. .turally, if these con-
ditions are satisfied for a given choice of untaxed good, they will not general-
ly work for another.
Ouranalysisof (5.6) has now generally ruled out uniform taxation. But
how should the taxes diverge from uniformity? A clue comes from considering the
prescription given by (5.6) for the case of sniall taxes. Suppose that the gov-
ernment is currently raising its revenue through lump sum taxes, and nnist now
shift over some of the revenue collection to distortionary taxes. From above,
we know that there is no first—order effect on utility of introducing distor—
tionarytaxes from a Pareto optimum, so that the effects on demand of this small
change inprices will be coiensated effects. Thus, to a first—order ¶Lrlor
approximation, the reduction in the demand for good i will be
—x.=— ES. p =—Es. t (5.13)
1jii j j 1j j
so that (5.6) calls for an equiproportional reduction in demand for each taxed
good. As suggested by Dix it (1970), this makes intuitive sense in light of
the excess burden formulae calculated above. From (3.3), the introduction—5.7—
ofsmalltaxest starting fromaPareto optimum induces an excess burden of
approximately:
L =1/2E t. x. =— 1/2E t. x. (5.lIi.)
1 1 1 11 1
sothat each small tax t. will induce an excess burden proportional to t x,. On
the other hand, the revenue raised by such a tax is tx.,. Thus, holding
tx1/x.constant across goods results in a constant ratio of excess burden to
revenue for each tax. This is precisely the sort of marginal condition one
would expect from minimizing total excess burden subject to a revenue constraint.
The actual taxes that lead to this result may be obtained by stacking con-
ditions (5.6) to obtain:
"
St=
C )x (5.15)
where S in the Slutsky matrix excluding good zero, and t(t1, ...,tN),and
xmitiplyingthroughby S
t=( )x S x .5.1
This yields no neat general expressions for t, though for various special cases
one can go a little further.
If there are only three goods, two taxed, then (5.16) yields the twoequations:
=(Y ; )(S22x1
—
S12x2)
(5.l7a)
= + S11x2) (5.1Th)—5.8—
where A =
S11S22
—
S12S21.Since S10 +p1S1
+p2S2
=0for i =1,2,we may
divide (5.lTa) by (5.lTb) andsubstituteto obtain:
t 1(s +s )x -S x
1=2 20 1 21 1 12 2 (18) t —1S +s s 2 'ip2 121x2 —
1
or, defining 0. =tO/p.and dividing the numerator and denominator of the right—
hand side of (5.18) by x1x2, we obtain (Harberger 196I)
0 +c +c i_ 20 21 12
2 10 21 12
p.
where, as before, is the compensated cross elasticity As 'we disco-
vered above, 1 =
82is an optimal solution only if the cross—elasticities
and c20 are equal.
If the cross effects c12 and c21 are zero, then (5.19) calls for a higher
tax on the taxed good that is the relative complement to the numeraire (e0 is
smaller). This has generated the somewhat misleading explanation that we
"can't" tax good zero, so we minimize distortions by taxing more heavily its
relative complement. Recall that the choice of untaxed good is arbitrary, and
that (5.19) applies for any numbering of the three goods. If the cross—
elasticities between goods 1 and 2 are nonzero, we mayevenobserve the anona—
bus result that the relative complement to good zero should receive a lighter
tax.
Fora larger number of commodities, a simple result obtains if we assume
that the matrix Sisdiagonal: all cross effects except with respect to good
zeroare zero. Since E S Pj =0,this implies that, for i =1,...,N,
sp+S0=0 (5.20)—5.9—
Thus,this restriction does depend on the choice of untaxed commodity. With
such a simplification, (5.16) yields the expressions:
=- (; (5.21)
or e.-el/c.,
1 11
where =
S11S22
—
S21S12
>0.
Thisis the celebrated "inverse elasticity" rule that calls for higher propor-
tional taxes on goods with relatively new own price elasticities. By (.20),
this rule is equivalent to
—
1/c0 (5.22)
as derived above for the three good case.
Since the inverse elasticity rule results from a restriction on preferen-
ces, the choice of untaxed good becomes relevant in that the restrictions may
makemoresense to assume no cross—effects among taxed goods if labor is
numeraire and the other goods are commodities than to do so if one of the com-
modities serves as the untaxed good.
The inverse elasticity rule of (5.21) is expressed in terms of compensated
elasticities. Yet in various places in the literature (Diamond and Mirrlees
1971; Bradford andRosen1976), it is expressed in terms of uricompensated elas-
ticities. This is the result neither of a revision of demand theory nor an
assumption of zero income effects. Rather, it comes about because of a differ-
ent, and equally arbitrary, restriction on preferences. We can express the
optimaltax formulae in terms of ordinary uncompensated demands by rearranging
(5.3):
dx
-E t =( A)x. (5.23) j jdp j 1—5.10—
which, assuming =0unless i =0or j, yields:
0.i/n.. (5.211.)
1 11
pdx
where rj.. =— — — isthe uncompensated own elasticity of demand for good i.
i pi
Expressions (5.21) and (5.21) differ because they result from different restric-
tions on the structure of preferences: different matrices are being assumed
diagonal.
5.2 Changing Producer Prices
The simple relaxation of the fixed producer price assumption has, perhaps
suprisingly, no effect at all on the optimal tax formulae in (5.16) as long as
producer prices result from competitive behavior and there are no pure profits
that are not taxed away by the government.
In place of the fixed producer price assumption of Subsection 5.1, we
assumethat production is governed by the production function
f(z) =0 (5.25)
where, as in Section 3, z is the production vector in the commodities
0, 1, ...,N.By the assumption of competitive behavior, we know that the pro-
ducer prices q are proportional to the vector of derivatives of f, df =(f0,
f •f).Withoutany loss of generality, we may set this proportionality
1'
'N
constant equal to one and, as before, choose good zero as numeraire, i.e.,
=1.
Thegovernment's revenue requirement must now be specified in terms of
individual commodities (as as the case of the compensation vector in Sec-
tion 3),sincerelative producer prices can change. We refer to this as the—5.11—
revenue vector, R. Thus, z= x+ R, where x is the household's vector of net
purchases.
Once production has been generalized to this stage, the possibility arises
of pure profits coming from decreasing returns to scale. We will consider this
more general case after first solving the optimal tax problem when f() embodies
constant returns to scale, i.e., is hornogenous of degree zero in all corn—
modities. By Euler's Theorem, profits are q •z=0.Thus, the government's
optimization problem becomes:
max V(p) subject to f(x +R)=0 (5.26)
where,because pure profits are zero, we can set p0 = = 1without anylossof
generality, and choose only p1, •••p.To use P rather than tas the control
variables, we must insure that arbitrary changes in tcan be brought about by
changes in p. This is accomplished by noting that
dp =dt+dq=dt+d(df)=dt+H(dx+dR) (5.27)
where H is the Hessian d2f of the production function, as before. Since dR =0
and dx may be characterized by the Slutsky equation, we have:
dx
dp= dt +H(S—x')dp
(5.28)
or
dx-I-i dp[I -H(S- xYl dt
where S is the Slutsky matrix. Moreover, since the changes in t are constrained
to keep revenue constant, and hence, in the neighborhood of the optimum, utility
as well, the changes in x are compensated and (5.28) simplifies to:—5.12—
dp =[I—HS1dt=2dt (5.29)
As long asis of full rank, we may control t indirectly through p.
The Lagrarigian corresponding to (5.26)yieldsthe first order conditions:
dx
—Ax. — Ef. =0 i =1,...,N (5.29) 1jJ p1
where A = and iiisthe Lagrange multiplier on the production constraint.
Since p •x 0,
P
+= 0 (5.30)
Using this and the fact that q =df,we mar express (5.29) as:
A x. +[Et
+xj=0 (5.31)
which is precisely condition (5.li). This result is due to Diamond and Mirrlees
(19'rl).
In the more general case where f() is not homogeneous of degree zero,
there may be pure profits, y =q
•z>0.In this case, we know from before,
equal taxes on all commodities amount to a profits tax on y, giving us N +1
rather than N independent instruments. Hence, if we cannot tax one good, this
represents a restriction unless we can tax profits directly. For expositional
purposes, it is easiest to let the N +1instruments be the taxes on goods
1, ...,Nand the profits tax, keeptirig t0 =0.We let the the rate of profits
tax.
The Lagrangian now is:
V(p, (i—t)y) —ii f(x+R) (5.32)—5.13—
Usingthe fact that p •x=(i—t)y,we may arrange the N first—order conditions
with respect to the taxest1, •••,tNto be:
—Ax. +A(1—t)
fr.—+ u[Zt + x.—(1—i)f—I = 0 (5.33)
It is straightforward to show that if tn.ybe freely- varied, then the N +1
first—order conditions are solved for t =0and A =i.':noexcess burden, with
profits taxes being used to raise all revenue. However, if Iisconstrained, we
must solve the N conditions in (5.33), given r.Unless profits taxes just hap-
pen to equal qB, we again face an optimal tax problem.
If t= 1,so that all profits are taxed away, then (5.33) reduces to the
previous optimal tax program, (5.31). Thus, pure profits do not change the pic-
ture unless they accrue at least partially to the household (Stiglitz and
Dasgupta 1971). If r is fixed at some value not equal to one, the formulas dif-
fer.
Since producer prices, and hence profits, change with,thederivatives
dx
in (5.33) include the indirect effect of on profits through changes in
production:
=dx+- (ir) ( ) dp. dp. q dy'
—
dp.
where y' =(1—t)y.
Using (5.314), the Slutsky equation, and the definition of ;the social
marginal utility of income, from (5.5), we may rewrite (5.33) as:
z = — (l—t) (5.35)
which differs from (5.6) only through the replacement of x. with (x. —(1—t>).—5. iii—
One can interpret these terms as the net increase in resources needed to main-
tain a given level of utility with respect to an increase inp in the two res-
pective cases.
If the profits tax I=0,and if good zero is the single production factor
and the sole good in which revenue is extracted, then one can show that (5.35)
yields the result obtained above for fixed producer prices, that to a first—
order Thylor approximation, substituting optimal taxes for lump sum taxes causes
an equiproportional reduction in the output of all taxed commodities. A for—
tiori, the outcome also holds •for the constant returns case Just examined.
This result is due to Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), who in turn attribute
it to Ramsey (1927), though the exact equivalence is obscured by differences in
methodolor.
The key to the single—factor assumption is that, since the production
function may be written:
f(x) =f(x1,...,x)
—
x0 (5.36)
the Hessian H =d2fis block diagonal in the untaxed good and all other goods
(H. =H .= 0for i * 0). Thus, the product of H and the substitution matrix S 1001
is
H O S' HS 10
HS =(_29-4_—)(_924__2) = (_22_924_._) (s.3'r)
0 IH S0 1S 01HS
where =Ql'...,SON)and H and S are the blocks of H and S for goods 1
through N. This means that the changes in consumer prices of the taxed goods,
p =(p1....,N'can be expressed (using 5.29) in the neighborhood of the op—
timum as:—5.15—
dp =ti—HS]dt = dt (5.38)
where t =Ct1,...,ta).That is, dp doesn't depend on the demand forx0. From
(5.38), we may express the first—order change around t= 0 in x, the vector of
taxed goods, as:
A A AA A AA * AA A A ASt (5.39)
The elements of the vector S t are described in (5.35). By the envelope theorem
and the fact that q0 =1,we may solve for the term-i:
=Ez = zE H S= Ez.E H. S (5.1o) dp. j dp.j>j kjk ki j>o .jk>Ojkki
wherethe last step relies on the assumption that H0 =0for j * 0. Stacking
these terms, we obtain:
(5.i)
dp
where=(z1,...,ZN).But by assumption, Ziszero, except in good zero, so
z =x.Since, also by assumption, t =0,it follows from (5.Ii) that
=— ( a)(ISH)X (5.12)
Substituting (5.142) into (5.39), weobtain:
- (1J;c&)SS_l(ISH)X
(s.')
=- — a) —i;_i = — a)
ii p-
asrequired.—5.16--
In the special case where both H andSare diagonal (i.e., there is no
joint production and conunodity demands are independent except with relation to
the numeraire), the expression (5.141) for simplifies to
d=z.H..S. (5.1i1)
Pj iii ii
which,if we again asume that all revenue raised is spent on the numeraire
(z. =x.for i >0),allows us to rewrite (5.35)as
—st
=(P
_
a)(1—(1_T)Hs1)
(5.145)
or .L+
p—as Cii ii
1 1 + (l—t)---—
wherec.. =— S..—-a..= and 8. =t./p.are the demand and supply elas—
11lix.' 11H.. x. 11 1
2. ii 1
ticitiesand ad valorem tax for good i.(See Stiglitz and tsgupta 1971 for a
slightly different formulation. Also see Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980.)
5.3ProductionEfficiency
•Thus far, we have assumed production to be efficient, with the only distor-
tions imposed by taxes to be with respect to household decisions. However, gov-
ernment can induce distortions in production, either through differential taxa-
tion of factors in different uses or through the use of different shadow prices
in public enterprises than those generated by coexisting competitive private
markets. Should these extrapolicyinstruments be used? Under certain well—
defined conditions, they should not.
To consider the desirability of such distortions, we follow Diamond and
Mirrlees (1971) and suppose there to be two production sectors, each efficient—5.17—
in its ownproductionbehavior. We shall refer to these as the private and
public sectors, though in some cases it may be more useful to think of them both
as subsectors of the private sector. The results are easily extended to several
sectors.
As before, e let f() and z be the production function and output of the
private sector, and introduce g(') and sas the corresponding variables for the
public sector. The use of distortions in the allocation of resources between
the two sectors may be thought of as the direct choice of public inputs, s.
Thus, the government's expanded choice problem is:
maxV(p,(l—t)y) subject to f(x +B—s)=0and g(s) =0 (5.16)
p,S — — — &_, —
wherey is private sector profits. Attaching the Lagrange multipliers iiand
to the production constraints, we obtain the same first—order conditions as
before with respect to p. With respect to swe get:
A(i-i) P (E f (1-t)_f1) -g.=0 (5.T)
Using the normalization q =dfand the consumer's budget constraint, we rewrite
this as:
A (i-i) 4_ C—t (i—r)-+(1—i)4_f1)-g. =0
or (5.8)
g. =f.
—(U
where,as before, c =A+iisthe social marginal utility of income. Thus,
dy f g.
there are two important cases in which efficient overall production =
will result: constant returns to scale in the private sector (Diamond and—5.18—
Mirrlees 1971) and decreasing returns with 100 percent profits taxation
(Stiglitz and Dasgupta 1971). Otherwise, inefficient production will be part of
theoptimal solution. The basic intuition is that as long as we can tax all but
one of the commodities, we can bring about any possible configuration of rela-
tive prices consistent with a given level of revenue. When after—tax profits
(l—t)y equal zero, these prices are the sole determinants of the consumer's de—
cisiori.Thus, any attainnnt of a set of relative prices using a production
distortion could also be obtained without one, with the simple result that the
consumer could be made better off. Note that this logic only holds if all the
taxes t1 through tN can be adjusted. With some of these held fixed, production
inefficiencies may be helpful in imposing indirect taxes on the goods thatcan-
not be freely taxed directly. We return to this point below in our discussion
of tax reform.
For the case where profits are not zero, we may simplify (5.18) for the
case of independent production. Considering ,wehave (using the envelope
theorem and independence assumption):
=Ez '(1—t)—z.— (5.49) ds.j j dz dy' ds. 1dz.
1 j 1 1
which,using the facts that q =dfand dq =H,and the assumption that all
governmentexpenditures are on the numeraire commodity, (x =z)we may solve as:
=— xH1 =—
ds.1 1—(1—r)E r 5.50
j dy'
where a.. is the supply elasticity for good i, and r imist be positive for a
stable solution. Thus (5.18) yields:
1+ k/n.
= .(ii) (51) jf 1+k/fl—5.19—
where k =(i_r)()/l >0.This result says that, relative to production
efficiency, private sector production should be subsidized in that commodity in
relatively inelastic supply.
5.1k Minimizing Excess Burden Through Optimal Taxation
By its definition, excess burden ought to be minimized when taxes are chos-
en to maximize utility. However, even for the fixed producer price case, we
have at least two candidates for measuring excess burden, and they will
generally take on different values. It turns out that only one, that based on
the equivalent variation, satisfies the desirable duality property of being min-
imized by optimal taxes (Kay 1980).
Recall from (2.9) that the equivalent variation measure of the excess bur-
den of a tax is:
EBE =E(,V(, y)) —E(,v(, y)) -R
=y—E(,V(p, y)) —B (5.52)
Thus, minimizing this for a given value of R amounts to maximizing E(, V(p,y)).
But,for a given price vector, expenditure increases monitonically with the
level of utility. Thus, we are maximizing v(, y), Just as in the optimal tax
problem. This is easily verified by differentiating the Lagrangian
E(, v(, y)) +it (R—(p—) (5•53)
For the compensating variation measure, which (from (2.10)) equals:
EBc =E(p1,V(p0, y)) —E(p,v(, y)) —R
=
E(p1,v(, y)) -y-B—5.20—
minimizing excess burden amounts to minimizing E(p.,V(p,y)):choosing
taxes to minimizetheexpenditure necessary to achieve the pre—tax utility
level. This need not be the same price vector as the one dictated by optimal
taxation. The appropriate tagrangian here is:
E(,v(, y))
— (R— — (5.55)
whichyields first—order conditions:
dx
—x.+ir[Et —-+x.]=0 (5.56)
1 jj P i
whichlooks like the one derived from(5.53).However,the value of xhere is
at the hypothetical point at higher prices but with compensation. In the pre-
vious case, itisat the actual optimal tax point.
This problem with the compensating variation also nans that we cannot cox-
pare twohypothetical alternatives to a given tax situationbycomparing their
marginalexcess burden measures. Only ifpreferencesare homothetic (Chipman
and Moore 1980) will this problem disappear. Of course,forpairwise
comparisons ,where the ?tinitialI point is not well—defined, the equivalent
variation and compensating variation are symmetrically defined, so there can be
no a priori benefit of using one versus the other.6.OptimalTaxation and the Structure of Preferences
This section considers the implications of the tax formulae derived above
for actual tax rates under different assumptions about the structure of prefer—
ences, andforthe more general case where there are several individuals and
hence distributional objectives to be satisfied. Although the results already
presentedexpress the optimal taxes in terms of the demands and substitution
matrix of the representative consumer, these terms are not generally constant,
so we have little insight into the general conditions on consumerpref-
erences required for either uniform taxation or any other specific tax structure
to be optimal. In exploring this question, we will also be able to investigate
more easily the impact of distributional objectives on the optimal tax struc—
tur e.
Before we continue our analysis, we note that equation (5.6), which expresses
the optimal taxes t= Ct1, ...,t)
in terms of the substitution matrix S and
the purchasesin th commodities 1, ...,N,may be extended to include the un-
taxed riumeraire good, zero. Obviously, adding a term multiplied by t0 to each
11
of the N first—order conditions has no effect, since t0 =0.Moreover, since
N N N N N ES.t.E(—EpS.)t.—Ep ZS.t. i=O 01 1 k0k ki 1i=ok 1=0 ki 1
(6.1) N _ ____ =
k=O ijx)
=
wemay rewrite (.6) as
st =—( (6.2)
This means that the optimal tax formula may be interpreted as calling for the
proportional redution in the purchases of all goods, not just taxed goods.—6.2—
This symxitry is required by the fact that the numeraire is arbitrarily
chosen.
6.1 Optimal Taxation from the Dual Perspective
To consider the role of preferences in determining optimal tax rules, it is
helpful to derive such rules using the direct utility function rather than the
indirect utility function. Though the derivation is less straightforward, the
results are in terms of the characteristics of the utility function and, hence,
preferences. This approach is taken by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976,
1980). However, a simpler and more elegant way of arriving at their results is
by transforming the optimal tax formulae thenselves using duality theory. The
technique described by Deaton (l979a, 1981a, l981b) makes use of the "distance"
function, sometimes referred to as the "direct" expenditure function (Cooter
1979). Our analysis here will generally follow that of Deaton. Because con-
sumer preferences are defined with respect to consumption, rather than purchases,
it is useful to separate these concepts by letting the vector of purchases x
equal x— where xis the consumption vector and the endowment vector. Thus,
we may rewrite the indirect utility function v(p), which implicitly holds xas
fixed, as V(p, p ),whichdoes not. This allows us to consider the effects
of changes in the consumer's lump sum income.
In words, the distance function is the solution to the following problem:
consider a consumption bundle x, and also all the combinations of price vector
p and total endowment income y such that V(p, y) equals (strictly speaking, at
most equals) some constant utility level U.Choosethe vector of prices that
minimizes p*/, given x. The resulting value is the distance function D(x, U).
Algebraically, the problem is:—6.3—
mm (* '')/ysubject to V(p*, y) ' (6.3)
p—
Itis explained diagrammatically in Figure 6.1, for the case of two goods. For
simplicity, we assume that x is on the indifference curve corresponding to the
utility level J, although only the scale of D() and not the price vector chosen
would be affected by increasing or decreasing x along the ray shown. This is
easily verified from inspection of (6.3), since minimizing (* x)/y is
equivalent to maximizing (* )/y for any A >0.By choosing x to be just
feasible, given U, we will obtain a value D(x, u)=1.
The figure depicts two different combinations of p and y, indexed 1 and 2,
that satisfy V(p*, y) =tJ.Since the price vector p results in a tangency away
from x, purchase of x would require a greater expenditure than y2. This is not
the case with p, since it is tangent to the indifference curve at x,.(A
flatter budget line wouldagainnecessitate an increase in expenditure to pur-
chase x.) Thus, the price vector chosen, given xand U, is tangent to the in-
difference curve corresponding toat point x (or, more generally, if x is not
on the indifference curve, at the point on the indifference curve on the ray
throughx from the origin). Just as the indirect expenditure function chooses
consumption, given prices and utility, the distance function chooses prices,
given consumption and utility. Since these prices are based on the consumer's
indirect utility function, we mayinterpretthem as points on the consumer's
inverse compensated demand curve, expressing willingness to pay. By the enve-
lope theorem, the partial derivatives of the distance function with respect to
the elements of ,arethose inverse demands:
3D —*
= u)=- (6.)
ax.1Figure 6.1
The Distance Function
xl
U
y22?C—6.5—
The Hessian of the distance function is referredto as the Antonelli matrix
12 A =(a.).
Now, consider the actual price vector that prevails,p, and choose x such
that x =x(p,U). Then, by construction, p =pand y =E(p,U) solve (6.3),
and we have the identity (from (6.I))
-- pi
a. [x(p, U), u) = (6.5) 1
E(p,t)
Multiplying (6.5)throughby E(p, ii), and differentiating with respect to each
price, we obtain conditions which can be stacked to yield:
E(p, ) AS =I (6.6)
where a =(aO...,aN).Evaluated at U =V(p,p ), this yields:
(p )As =I—ax(p,p ) (6.7)
Multiplying both sides of (6.2) by (p )A, and using the fact thatsince a is
homogeneous of degree zero with respect to x, Ax= 0, we obtain:
u-a - - t=a(x+ x)'t-( )(px)A(x- x)
(6.8)
=a(R+t ) +(u-a)(.)A
where R =tx is tax revenue. Using the fact that
t00 to eliminate
(Ii— a)we obtain (Deaton 1981b):
1.1-6.6—
t.R+tx (Aj). a -
')(i—10) 1p. - — a.
1 p
•x (Ax)0
1
(6.9)
x3ina./3x
=,(1_Ji
1i)
Ex 9 in a /9
ji 0 J
which,in turn, implies that, for any i and j,
3 in (a Ia.)
—ii 0. —0=v'E x (6.10)
1j j
J
where v' =v/(Edin a0/dx). From(6.10),we see that a sufficient condi-
tion for the taxes to be the same is that the ratio of marginal valuations
(a./a.) be independent of the consumption of commodities in which the consumer
has an endowment. This is equivalent to the distance function being separable,
or capable of being expressed as:
D(x, )=f(x1,2' 0)) (6.11)
where are the commodities in which there is an endowment and are the goods
on which taxes are uniforrn)3 It also follows that the normal or indirect
expenditure function is separable in the corresponding prices (Gorinan 1976).
This separability of the expenditure function is referred to as implicit separ-
ability and differs from the separability of the direct and indirect utility
functions. Indeed, they are the same only if the utility function is homnogen—
eous in as well (Deaton 1981a), and it is easy to construct counter examplesfor the case where preferences are just weakly separable (Auerbach 1979a).
In the special case where the consumer's only endowment is in the nuineraire
commodity (presumably leisure), the sufficient (and now necessary, as well) con-
dition for uniform taxation of commodities is implicit separability from leisure
(Sandmo l9'fl.).It is also possible in this case to say more about which goods
will be taxed more heavily if weak separability but not homogeneity is
satisfied. We begin by rewriting (6.10) as:
3 ln(a./a.)
0. —0.=v' (6.12) 1 °
wherev' =
v/(x0a00/a0).
By the convexity of D(.), v' has the opposite sign of Vandhence is nega-
tive (since (' >0:irgina1 excess bUrden is positive). Since
a./a. =
pa/p.
=
Uj/Ui,
dln(IJ/tJ.) dln(a./a.)31n(a/a.) 3ln(a/a.)dU j 1= 31= 1+ 1• (6.13)
dx0 dx0 3x
(Deatori 1981a). Thus, when utility is separable into goods and leisure, (6.12)
becomes:
3 ln (a la,)
e.—o=—v' 1• (6.i) 1j 0
dO
so that taxes will be higher on those goods that are necessities, as defined by
those whose valuation by the consumer declines relatively with an increase in
real income. This is particularly important if we use empirical den.nd estirna—
tes based on restricted functional forms to estimate optimal taxes. For
example, the linear expenditure system:—6.8—
b.(px —.pc)
(p, p00) =(E)
(6.15) jJ
1
oftenused in empirical work comes from the Stone—Geary utility function:
b.
u() = — a.)
1 (6.16)
1 1
whichis strongly separable, but not homogeneous unless the terms a equal zero
(in which case it is simply Cobb—Dou1as).
6.2 Distributional Objectives
Once we allow for the presence of several individuals with different tastes
or income, distributional considerations become anissue.1 As stressed in
Section 3, these consideratoris must be represented by the specification of an
explicit social welfare function based on individual utilities. This cannot
normally be achieved by the direct choice of distributional weights on indivi-
dual income unless the weights are allowed to change with prices in a compli-
cated fashion. There are two problems we consider in this subsection. First,
when and how are the previously derived optional tax rules influenced by equity
considerations? Second, if we choose leisure as numeraire and admit lump sum
taxes that cannot vary across individuals, when ill uniform commodity taxes be
optimal? That is, when will linear income taxation be optimal?
We begin by specifying a social welfare function of the form
w =w(u',..., (6.17)
which, maximized subject to the usual revenue constraint under the assumption of
zero profits in the private sector, yields the following N first—order conditions
for'optimal commodity taxes t =(t1,...,tN):—6.9—
h
zw+ [Et E+ =0 i=1,...,N (6.i8) h h 1
ihdp1
1
h
where w = A'= andx. =E Defining as before, to be the h h 1 h-
social n.rginal utility of individual h's income:
h h dR a =Wh A ÷
(6.19)
dy
we may express the conditions (6.18) as:
t. s =_()x. i1,...,N (6.20)
where S.=Es?and
iJh ij
h
x.
=E()ah (6.21)
is the average value of a, weighted by individual consumption sharesof good 1.
This neat formulation (due to Diamond 1975) shows that the "equalproportional
reduction" rule is amended to call for a greater proportional redutionin the
purchase of commodities for which a. is small. The implication of this result
is more clearly seen if we note (following Feldstein 1972) that
h
=Coy ah)+ E ah (6.22) 1 X h
so that .exceedsthe unweighted mean of if and only if purchases of commod-
ity i are positively correlated with a over individuals. Normally, this would
define a necessary good, whose budget shares fall with Income and hence rise—6.10—
with .Note,however, that (6.20) applies to proportional reductions in pur-
chases of different commodities, and does not offer an explicit solution for
individual tax rates, unless we assume aggregate commodity demands to be inde-
pendent (s.. =0for i * j). This yields
e. €.iJ ( 1) (62)
0. c..
jii ii— ci.
which says that the normal inverse elasticity rule is changed by the addition
of a second term expressing distributional concerns. Note that as marginal
excess burden, and hence the size of i' relative to ,increases,efficiency con-
siderations come to dominate these optimal tax rules (Feldstein 1972).
The addition of the possibility of lump sum taxation increases the general-
ity of the problem without nuch additional complexity. If individuals have
one source of income, then the combination of N commodity taxes and a lump sum
tax may be thought of as a linear income tax plus N—i additional commodity
taxes. The ability to use lump sum taxation simply adds a constant tax term T
to each consumer's indirect utility function and a term HT to the revenue con-
straint. Differentiating the expanded tagrangian with respect to T, we obtain
the additional first order condition
h
dx
— w h + E—.— HI=0 (6.21L) h h ihdy
to be added to the N condition in (6.18). This new condition simplifies to
=1E h = (6.25)—6.ii—
Thus,(6.20) becomes
rXi h
COV),
EtS x1 i=1,...,N(6.26)
Now,there should be reductions in commodity purchases only to the extent that
the good in question is consumed relatively more by people with low valuesof
With equal distributional weights, h each of these reductions would bezero,
and hence pure lump sumtaxationwould be optimal.
An interesting question to ask here is under what conditionsproportional
ti t taxes e =(—, ..., —) willbe equal? In other words, since such uniform taxes ,'l
are equivalent to a single, proportional tax on the nurneraire, labor, when isa
linear income tax optimal? A sufficient condition (Deaton 1979b) is thateach
individual h have a utility function weakly separable into goods andleisure,
with the subfunction in goods possessing linear Engel curves withcommon slopes
across individuals. The intuition behind this result is that the restriction on
goods is that preferences obey the Gorman polar form required for exactaggrega-
tion of commodity demands. If we can perform such aggregation, thenwe cannot
use differential taxation to distinguish among individuals for purposes of re-
distribution: a linear income tax exhausts our capacity in this regard.
Note the similarity of this result to that of the case of non—linear income
taxation (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976), where weak separability alone is suffi-
cient for the optimality of income taxation. There is a clear relationship here
between the relaxation of the restriction on the linearity of taxes, on theone
hand, and that on the linearity of preferences, on the other.
Empirical studies of optimal taxation are not veiy common, perhaps because
the information needed concerning various cross—substitution terms is difficult—6.12—
to obtain without a restriction on preferences that prejudges the result. Two
studies, by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972) and Deaton (1977), utilize the linear
expenditure system, which causes higher taxes on necessities in the single con-
sumer case (as discussed above) and, in the xa1lti—consumer case with lump sum
taxes available, calls for no differential commodity taxes at all, since the
Gorman conditions are satisfied. Nevertheless, these calculations are still
instructive. Deaton, for example, calculates the optimal taxes on commodities
under the assumption that labor is fixed and there are no lump sum taxes.
Obviously, with fixed labor supply, uniform taxes on comn1odities are nondistor—
tionary, but mayhaveundesirable distributional effects. For a demandsystem
estimated for the U.K., he calculated optimal tax rates for eight groups of com-
modities under various assumptions about the degree of inequality in the social
welfare function. Perhaps the imst interesting result obtained was that optimal
tax rates do not behave monotonically with respect to the degree of inequality
aversion implicit in the social welfare function.1.FurtherTopicsin OptimalTaxation
There are a number of particular problems involving taxation generally to
which optimal tax theory has been applied. This section presents some of these.
7.1 Public Goods Provision
The classic conditions for efficiency in the provision of public goods were
derived by Samuelsori (195).). Aside from the standard requirement that, forpri-
vate (rival) goods, each consumer's marginal rate of substitution between two
goods should equal the social marginal rate of transformation, there was the new
condition that, between a private and a public good, the marginal rate of trans-
formation should equal the sum of individual marginal rates of substitution.
This is because every consumer partakes of each additional unit of the public
good.
Pigou (l9i7) argued that in considering the benefits of a new public pro-
ject, the government should recognize that its undertaking may require the
introduction of additional deadweight loss through the tax system. The implica-
tion that this increases the social cost of public goods has been addressed by a
number of authors, including Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), Stiglitz and Dasgupta
(1971) and Atkinson and Stern (197i).
Even to examine the question of public goods, we nust allow for thepre-
sence of several individuals. Since we are not directly interested in distribu-
tional issues here, we assume all H individuals to be identical in all respects.
If we let G be a public good on which all government revenue is spent and which
all consume, then each individual's indirect utility function becomes:
V(p; G) =maxU(x;G) subject to p •x=0 (7.1) - x — p•4
with-
=
x
=x(p;G). The production function is f(x; G) =0.The
government maximizes the welfare of the representative individual by maximizing—7.2—
the sumofindividual utilities, since all individuals are the same. This gives
rise to the Lagrangian:
L =HV(p;G) —ii f(x;G) (1.2)
with first order conditions with respect to each price (except that of the
untaxed numeraire):
dx
—HA x—.' Ef =0 i=l,...,N (r.) 1 •jp1
where A and .iaredefined in the usual way.Asin Subsection 5.2, we use the
fact that p •xh=0for each individual h to obtain:
dx.
A x. +i.' IEt +xi=0 i=l,...,N 1 jdp. 1
wherex. =Extl=Hx.Asbefore, this may be rewritten:
1h1 1
st=— (P;a) (7.5)
whereS is the aggregate Slutsky matrix and a is the social marginal utility of
each individual's income.
The first—order condition with respect to the choice of public good G is:
i[Ef.+G1 =0 (7.6)
whichyields (since A dU/dx, q =f0
=1and px1 =0):
dU/dG—(l(GdB
(
hdU/dx0 LA)LfdG
where R is the revenue collected (equal to the public goods purcahsed, in eq.ui—
libriuin). This result says that the appropriate social cost of the public
good G in terms of the numeraire, x0, to which the sum of marginal rates of sub-
stitution should be set equal, differs from the marginal rate of transformation—7.3—
f
for two reasons. First, if public goods are complementary to taxed goods,
0
increasing G may reduce excess burden by increasing consumption of taxed goods,
making >0(Diamond and Mirrlees 1971). The other term, -,equalsthe ratio
of the marginal disutility of raising a dollar of revenue divided by the margin-
al utility of income, and exceeds one to the extent that an increase in revenue
increases excess burden. This corresponds to the point raised by Pigou. How-
ever, it need not be the case thatexceeds one. Again, there is an income
effect at work.
This possibility is demonstrated (following Atkinson and Stern) by xilti—
plying both sides of (7.5) by the vector t to obtain
t'st=-( (7.8)
which, by the negative semi—definiteness of S, implies that I >afor positive
revenue. Buta )X(seeequation 5.5) onlyif is positive. If taxed goods
are, on average (weighted by tax rates) inferior, <0and A >a.Hence,A
mayactuallyexceed i, meaning that raising an additional dollar to pay for pub-
lic goods mayactuallylessen excess burden by causing a shift toward the con—
suinption of taxed goods.
7.2 Externalities
Referring again to Pigou, we know that the appropriate response by the gov-
ernment (under conditions of perfect information) to an externality is the iinpo—
sition of a tax that causes producers of the externality to internalize the
additional social cost (or benefi't) of their action. Suppose, however, that all
commodities, including the one possessing the externality, are subject to dis—
tortionary taxation.How isthe Pigouvian prescription affected? Following
Sandmo(1975),we assume identical individuals, fixed producer prices and let—T.4—
the externality be a symmetric consumption externality related to totalcorisunip—
tion of good N. Thus, individual utility for the representative individual h is
U(xh;XNwhere XN =HxThe paial derivative of U with respect toXN may
be positive or negative. Assumingforconvenience that each individual taxes xN
as given (as will be approximately true for H large), we may express the corres-
ponding indirect utility function as V(p; xN), parallel to the public good example,
with-s =l(;'
Maximizingthe sum of utilities with respect to Psubject to the need to
raise revenue B throughdistortionarytaxes yields the N first—order conditions:
—Ax.+ • + .i[x.+Et-] =0 (i1,...,N) (7.9)
or
*dx.
—Ax. +i[x.+Et —-1= 0 (i=l,...,N) (7.10) 11 jj Pi
where t. =tY i =1,...,N—i 1 1
t—IIau i =N
1
Equation(7.10) is the standard optimal tax result, but it applies to the vector
t' rather than t. The difference between them implies that the optimal tax on
good N equals that dictated by the standard formula pius the externality imposed
by additional consumption of the good: the Pigouvian tax. Thus, the optimal tax
and Pigouian taxes are separable, in a sense; we may imagine choosing the two
independently. However, this independence is only present analytically, since
the actual level of the externality, and hence the Pigouvian tax, depends on the—7.5—
actual equilibrium and hence the optimal tax rates; the same is true in the
other direction.
7.3Pre—existingDistortions
If the government faces pre—existing distortions (of which the preceding
example of externalities is a specific kind), it may wish to alter its choice of
optimal taxes. Following Green (1961), let us assume that lump sum taxes are
available, but certain prices are distorted and cannot be influenced directly.
This could be the result of nonconipetitive behavior, but we shall assume it to
be due to some tax that iust be maintained, perhaps for political purposes.
Assuming that the representative individual's only lump sum income is from the
government, we have the problem
maxV(p,—T) subject to (p—q)x +T .R (7.11)
p* ,T
where p is the subset of p that may be adjusted. Note that unless at least
two prices are fixed, equiproportional, nondistortionary taxation is possible.
Differentiating the Lagrangian corresponding to (7.11) with respect to
and T yields:
—X x.+ Et- +xi=0 p p (T.12a)
dx
—A+ Et +i]=0 (7.12b) j jy
which may be written as:
= — ( p.c p (7.13a)
(7.1 3b)—7.6—
forct defined as above. These conditions are quite familiar, and yield the
requirement that
E s5t=o p c (7.1k)
This does not result in uniform taxes unless at rxst one tax is fixed (in which
case the zero degree homogeneity of S allows us to choose any level of propor-
tional taxes). In particular, suppose all taxes but t1 are fixed, and t0 =t3
=••• t = 0.Then there is one condition, corresponding to the choice of t1.
Using compensated elasticities =— S—i,wemayexpressthis as:
o =
_02dl2'€ll (7.15)
where 0 =tjp.is the proportional tax on good i.Since C11< 0,this calls
for a tax on good 1 (assuming 02 >0),t' >0,and a subsidy if c12 <0.If
the distorted good is a substitute to good 1, a tax on good 1 will shift con—
sumption into good 2, lessening the original distortion. xing a complement,
however, would worsen the distortion. (Compare butter and margarine vs. left
shoes and right shoes.)
In the wider case in which there are several pre—existing distortions and a
single free instrument, t1, the condition is:
81 =
— (7.16)
sothat the complement—substitute rule nowappliesto the tax—weighted commodity
average. More generally, when several instruments can be set, the results are
more complicated.
Several other authors have considered particular restrictions on commodity
taxation and profits taxation (for example, 1.sgupta and Stiglitz 1972 and
Mirrlees 1912) and the effect of such restrictions on the desirability of pro-
duction efficiency. P1uerbach (l979b) considers the particular production—7.7—
distortion of differential capital income taxation, obtaining a result about
separability of factors in production that closely parallels those on the con-.
sumption side already discussed in Section 6.
7. Taxationand Risk
There are many interesting questions that concern the interaction between
taxes and risk—bearing. A particular one that fits into the current discussion
is the optimal taxation of risky assets. This problem was first examined by
Stiglitz (1972) and extended by Auerbach (1981). The basic insight is that the
optimal tax results already derived can be applied directly to the case of risky
assets by imagining the commodities being taxed to be Arrow—Debreu state—
contingent ones. The differences that arise come from the fact that we normally
make different assumptions about the structure of utility functions and the corn-
pleteness of markets when we deal with risk.
The basic model we consider, following Stiglitz (1972), is a two—period
model in which the representative individual may consume a certain good
(leisure) out of some endowment, and may purchase one of two linearly indepen-
dent assets yielding returns in two states at date 1.Because the two assets
span the states of nature, the consumer may purchase any combination of state—
contingent commodities at date 1, and there is a well—defined ilicit price for
each. A corollary of this is that there is a unique pair of tax rates on com-
modities in the two states corresponding to each tax regime that applies to the
assets themselves. This is helpful, because though our optimal tax results
apply to the former, actual tax rules normally apply to the latter.In the
more general case without asset spanning, the optimal tax problem becomes more
complicated, just as it would if individual commodities in a riskiess world
could not be purchased independently. Stiglitz (1972) obtained his main result—7.8—
concerningthe relative taxation of a risky and a riskiess asset from a direct
consideration of the effects of taxation on asset demands. It is, perhaps,
easier to see the connection with previous results, and the effects of particu-
lar assumptions, if we begin with the state—contingent commodities themselves
(following Auerbach 1981).
Letting the good consumed in period 0 be good zero, and the other two corn-
modities be labelled 1 and 2, and taking good 0 to be nunieraire, we have
the basic optimal tax rule (5.19), which we write here for convenience
&C +C +C
1 12 21 20
C C C 7.17
212+ 21+ 10
This result can be simplified if we adopt the axioms necessary for the consumer
to engage in expected utility maximization. In this case, the consumer's objec-
tive function becomes
U(x0, x1, x2) =1T1TJ1(x0,x1)
+
ir2U2(x0,x2) (7.18)
1, 2,
where U .')= U') and and £20 may be expressed as
x. d in(&/U1)
= —j
+jj dx:
2
1=1,2, j=2,1 (7.19)
-
U2
where M is a positive constant and U. and U. are first and second derivatives of
1 ij
utility. The second term in brackets in (7.19) is familiar from Section 6,and
equalszeroif preferences are weakly separable between periods. If this is so
(inwhich case,utility is also strongly separable, since it is already assumed
separable between states), then the tax on ood 1 should be higher than that on
______ U22x2
good 2 if and only if — >—
2
but these are just the
U2 U2—7.9—
Arrow (19G5)—Pratt (l96) measuresofrelative risk—aversion in the two states.
Intuitively, as an individual becomes more risk—averse, his behavior becomes
less responsive to differences in rates of return. Thus,a tax is less distor—
tionary.
That taxes should be equal when relative risk aversion is constant is
not surprising, even without knowledge of the basic optimal tax results. It
is for this class of preferences that the basic results of Saxnuélson (1969) and
Merton (1969) concerning the separation of portfolio and savings decisions
apply. If we can't influence the amount of savings, and hence leisure consumed,
by inducing portfolio shifts, then such a relative distortion hasnobenefit.
To convert these results to the taxes on the two assets themselves, which
we label A and B, we use the fact (see Auerbach 1981) that
12 21
0A —0B
=sgnrA rB —rArB sgn 61 —02 7.20
where r is the return in state i of assetj. Assuming one asset, which we take
to be asset A without loss of generality, is risk—free, then the tax should
be greater (smaller) on the risky asset B if relative risk—aversion ishigher
(lower) in the state with the higher (lower) return.In other words, the risky
asset should face a higher or lower tax than the safe asset according to whether
relative risk aversion is increasing or decreasing (Stiglitz 1972). Moregener-
ally, if both assets are risky, then one can apply any standard notion of
increasing risk (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1970) to argue that if asset B is
risker than asset A, its return will be more dispersed and hence (r r —rr)
will be positive. This will yield asimilar result for taxation of the riskier
asset.
It is importantto recognize that these results assume complete, competi-
tivemarkets. While a comn assumption without risk, it is less acceptable—7.10—
when the commodities concerned are state—contingent. (The same critique also
applies to intertemporal problems with date—indexed goods.) In particular, we
are implicitly assuming that the government cannot increase the diversification
of risk by collecting risky taxes and pooling them. In a real world context
where many assets are not traded, this may be a highly questionable restriction
to impose.
A second issue of taxation and risk concerns the question of whether the
government can increase the welfare of the representative individual by inducing
risk through the tax system. Normally, risk averse individuals are made worse
off by being forced to bear risk. However, the optimal taxation equilibrium is
a distorted one, and the famous dictum of Lipsey and Lancaster (1956—7) applies
here: once one condition for a I.reto optimum is violated, there is no reason
to expect that the violation of others will necessarily worsen matters.
There are to general strands in the literature that deal with the use of
induced risk as a policy tool. Weiss (1976) shows that a random tax system, or
one in which there is tax evasion with a probability of detection, may be
superior to a certain tax system because, under specified conditions with
respect to individual preferences, such risk may lessen the labor supply distor-
tion of the income tax.(Also see Sandmo 1981 on the subject of tax evasion.)
A second issue relates to the case of several individuals, and arises from
the possibility that in the presence of indirect taxation, the utility possibi-
lity frontier may be nonconvex. Even with identical individuals, then, we might
•wish to tax the consumption of the same good by different individuals at dif-
ferent rates (Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976, 1980). This is depicted in Figure
7.1.Supposetwo individuals, 1 and 2, have identical preferences and consumeFigure 7.1
ptima1Taxationwith Nonconvexities
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goods and leisure. If we seek to maximize (U1 +u2)bychoosing individual—
specific excise taxes on consumption, the first—order condition will be zero
with equal taxes at U1 =
U2
=tJE,by the symmetry of the problem. But this may
represent a local minimum, as shown. Social welfare may be improved by choosing
either point A or point B. This represents an unequal treatment of equal indi-
viduals and may- violate proscriptions against such horizontal equity. However,
suppose the tax system were randomized so that point A were chosen half the
time, and point B the other half. This would give the same expected utility to
each individual. ?vbreover, it would yield the same value of the social welfare
function, defined on individual expected utilities, as before at either A or B:
EU1 +EU2
=1I2EUL+t]']+V2Et] + = + tJ- (7.21)
Thus, randomization may be desirable.8.TaxReform
All of the optimal tax problems analyzed thus far share in common the fact
that global optima are sought. There are a number of new issues arising froma
consideration of tax reform, rather than tax design.
One problem of tax reform derives from the existence of an initial alloca-
tion. Though a new tax system may be more efficient and more equitable than the
existing one, the transition from old to new may cause a redistribution of
resources to occur than in itself is undesirable. For example, it has often
been suggested in the U.S. that the tax subsidy for state and nrunicipal bonds be
removed. If this were done unexpectedly, it would cause a capital loss for the
holders of such bonds, but not for other, otherwise identical individuals. Such
treatment may be thought of as a violation of horizontal equity (Feldstein 1976)
which may be explicitly accounted for in an expanded social welfare function (King
1982a). This problem undoubtedly is one of the reasons why tax reform isso dif-
ficult to achieve.
A second general problem of tax reform, which shall be the main focus of
this section, is that the direction in which to ive from the current system is
not always evident. Even if all distortions can be reduced somewhat, this may
not increase economic efficiency. The basic difficulty is that we can only be
sure that movennt in the direction of a global optimum will improve matters if
we are sufficiently close to that optimum initially. A related problem is
whether one can increase economic efficiency in a piecemeal fashion, by remain-
ing distortion, one at a time. In general, such a scheme for tax reform may
decrease welfare along the transition path to a global optimum. Restrictions on
preferences and production sufficient to prevent this are extremely restrictive
(Boadway and Harris 1977).-8.2—
8.1 Moving to Lump Sum Taxation
Lump sum taxes are nondistortionary, but it need not follow that partially
reducing distortions and replacing them with lump sum taxes will improve effi-
ciency. One case in which it will is when the distortioriary tax rates are set
at each point of the transition at the optimal tax rates for the revenue being
collected by non—lump sum taxes. That is, if a certain amount ofrevenue, R, is
collected initially by the distortionary taxes, and a lump sum tax T is intro-.
duced, the new taxes should be those optimal for collecting R —T.As T
increases, this sequence of optimal tax rates insures a monotonic increase in
utility. This result is due to Atkinson and Stern (1974), and demonstrated as
follows. Consider the optimal tax problem:
maxV(p,—T)subject to (p —q)x +T) R (8.1) T,p — — — —
whereT is the lump sum tax faced by the individual. Differentiating the cor-
responding Lagrangian with respect to T yields the effect of an increase in T on
utility,given that pis chosen optimally:
dx
—x + [_E t += ( — a) (8.2) dT j y
where A,a andiiaredefined in the usualway to be the marginal utility of
income, the social marginal utility of income and the Lagrange multiplier on the
revenueconstraint. However, we know from expression (i.8) that M >ci,so util-
ity must increase as T does: when the tax vector t is chosen optimally, there
is always a positive marginal excess burden to revenue collection.
Unfortunately, this is not a very realistic assumption to make in the
current context. The taxes we may wish to reform may cause unnecessarily—8.3—
largedistortions, and we mayberestricted to a proportional reduction formula,
or someother constraint on how they are to be lowered.
Consider the case of an arbitrary changein the levels of excise taxes t
andlump sumtaxes Tfor the case of a single individual and fixed producer
prices. (This latter assumption can 'berelaxed.See Dixit 1975.) We have
(following Atkinson and Stiglitz 1980):
dU = fdt.— dT=— A Cx'dt+dT) (8.3a)
and dR =d(tx +T)=xdt+t
•dx+dT=0 (8.3b)
which yields
dU Xt dx (8.b)
Utility is increased by the tax change if consumption changes to increase
revenue from the existing taxes, thereby reducing the associated excess burden.
From the Slutsky equation, we have:
dx dx dx
dx=dt—dT=Sdt--'(x'dt+dT) (8.5)
which,combined with (8.3b) and (8.1)yields
dU = tJSdt (8.6)
1 —t.dx
dy_8.14_
Thisholds for any change in t and T, and can be useful in ana]yzing par-
ticular kinds of tax reforms. For example, suppose all distortions are reduced
proportionally, i.e., dt =—bt.Then because S is negative semi—definite,
dx
dU0 if and only if (1 —t 0 (Dixit 1975). This condition says that
a dollar increase in income causes the consumer to pay less than a dollar in
additional excise taxes. Since p =q+t,it is equivalent to the requirement
that q •xincrease with y: as the consumer spends more, the social cost of the
goods purchased also increases. If this condition is violated, then it is
possible that multiple equilibria exist, and the tax reduction my move the eco—
nonr away from the undistorted optimum (Foster and Sonnenschein 1970).
This my be demonstrated graphically (following Hatta 1977) for the simple
case in which there are only two goods. Suppose that a certain revenue B
(measured in units of commodity 1) must be raised, and that the consumer has an
endowment The possible equilibria lie along the social production
constraint M in Figure 8.1. Superimposed on this constraint are a series of
indifference curves, the highest feasible one passing through point A, the un-
distorted optimum. Normally, we would expect that as we travel along M from
point A toward either axis, decreasing the feasible utility level, the marginal
rate of substitution between x1 andx2 changes monotonically. (This is true,
of course, for movements along an indifference curve and, hence, for local
movements away from A along M, where there is no first order income effect.) If
this is the case, then a revenue—preserving reduction in the divergence between
the relative price of x2 and its social cast, in terms ofx1, must increase uti-
lity, for it will induce a movement along M toward point A. However, there may
be cases in which there is no such monotonicity, and a given slope may be had by
an odd number of different points on M, not just one. In this case, distortions
in the price reduction mayactuallymove the consumer away from point A.Figure 8.1
PricesandUtility
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x2—8.6—
That this possibility is equivalent to the condition derived from (8.6) is
demonstrated graphically in Figure 8.2, where an increase in lump sum income
above causes the consumer to shift from point B to point C, inside the pro.-.
duction constraint M. Since the indifference curve slopes at B and C are the
same, the slope at D must be flatter than at B. Thus, a steepening of the
consumer's budget line resulting from a reduction in the price distortion will
cause a movement away from B, along M, toward the x1—axis rather than toward D
and A, thereby lowering the consumer's utility.
A particular aplplication of this result is that when equilibrium is uni-
que, a consumption tax is superior to a wage tax in the presence of pure rents,
since the former tax is equivalent to the latter in conjunction with a lump sum
rent tax (Helpman and Sadka 1982).
Another result that follows from (8.6) is for the case where the tax dis-
tortion is zero for one good (arbitrarily, good zero) and equiproportional for
other goods. That is•, in our previous notation, t =8p •Sincep'S =0,
(8.6) may be rewritten
dU=—
A S0dt (8.7)
dy
where = O2'SON).
A sufficient condition for this to be
dR . positive(assuming —< i)is that taxes be decreased on substitutes for good
zero (s0 >0)and increased on complements (Dixit 1975).
8.2 Reform Without Lump Sum Taxation
This problem is harder, because there is no obvious "first—best" looming in
the distance to guide our movement. General characterization of the direction
in which taxes should be changed is a difficult problem, and while progress hasM
Figure 8.2
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been made (Guesnerie 1977, Diewert 1978), there is little we can say of a con-
crete nature without further assumptions.
One approach that sidesteps this problem is to characterize observable
changes in equilibrium that will result if welfare is improved. Following
Pazner and Sadka (1981), we can use revealed preference theory to evaluate a
balanced budget change in distortionary taxes. Let t, =p
—qbe the initial
set of taxes (with producer prices fixed) and t = — q.be the prospective
change. If > •x(where x and are the purchases in the two
situations), then is preferred by the consumer. Hence, utility has
increased. }bwever, since d(tx) =0,q x =cix, so that t
•x
>t
•, or x >0.(Note the similarity of this discrete condition
to (8.4).) Likewise, if
• x<0,the original situation is preferred.
Unfortunately, there is an indeterminate range in which neither of these condi-
tions is satisfied.
If we assume producer prices to be fixed (here this restriction is neces-
sary) and that all goods but the nunieraire are taxed uniformly, then we can
characterize a utility increasing tax change. The three—good case was analyzed
by Corlett and Hague (1953—4), with a generalization provided by Dixit (1975),
whose anlaysis we follow. Note that (8.4) still is valid in determining whether
a tax change icnreases utility. However, since lump—sum taxes are unavailable,
t •x0. Using (8. 5), for dT =0,we have:
O =d(t) dt+ t d= x dt+ '
= ('+t,') dt (8.8)—8.9.—
where=1—t •Forthe case where t0 =0and t =e p,we use the homo—
geneityof S to rewrite this as:
(x' — dt,=0 (8.9)
which,using the definition of compensated elasticities t =S1-
Ex. (1 —— c.)dt.=0 ji iO 1
From(8.I),wehave (for dT =0):
dU =—A dt (8.10)
If we assume that x (i —- c.0)
= ispositive, and maketherelated assump-
tion thatis positive, then (comparing (8.9)and(8.10)), in changing two
taxes,we should decrease the one for which
x.(1 ——c. 1 10
(8.11)
x.1
issmaller, or is larger ——increasethe tax on the relative complement.
This extends in an obvious way if we choose pairs of taxes successively.Footnotes
1. tpuit (i8).
2. See, for example, Diewert (1981).
3. ]..tpuit, cit, p. 278. For this particular rediscovery, I am indebted to
the historical analysis of Atkinson and Stern (1980).
4.SeeHotellirig (1938) for the original statement of this result.
5. We use here the identity x(p, E(p,u)) =x(p,
u).
6. This was pointed out by Hausx!lan (1981a), among others.
7. See Auerbach and Rosen (1980) for further discussion.
8. One can also derive higher order approximations of
EBc.Fora comparison
of second and third order approximations, see Green and Sheshinski (1979).
9. See Hausman (1981a).
10. This may be seen by substituting (3.8) into (3.9), and considering the 'Iy—
br approximation of the change in 8:
d8 d24 • t+1/2t' (—)t dt — dt
which yields
8— (t'x(i+ 1/2 a q) +1/2t' x)
In deriving a similar measure, Diamond and McFadden (1976) assumed all com-
pensation to be in the form of the numeraire good, in which case a •q=0.
11. This uses the facts that
k_Okki
=0and p •x=0, and equation (5.15).
12. See Deaton(1979a) for further discussion of the properties of the function
D(') and the matrix A.
13. Because D() is homogeneous of degree 1 in ,fmust be homogeneous of
degree 1 in andandhomogeneous of degree 1 in x.
iL Indeed, even if all individuals are identical, the optimal tax system need
not dictate identical treatment. This is discussed in Section 7.References
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